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Abstract  
 
Is orchestration democratically legitimate? The importance of this question is signaled 
by recent theoretical and empirical developments of international organizations. On 
one hand, debates concerning the legitimacy and democratic deficits of international 
politics continue unabated. On the other, the Secretariat of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has progressively engaged in 
processes of orchestration culminating in the 2015 Paris Agreement. Scholarship on 
orchestration has almost exclusively focused on how to ensure effectiveness while 
excluding normative questions. This lacuna is addressed by arguing that orchestration 
should be assessed according to its democratic credentials. The promises and pitfalls 
of orchestration can be usefully analyzed by applying a set of democratic values: 
participation, deliberation, accountability, and transparency. Two major orchestration 
efforts by the UNFCCC both pre- and post-Paris are shown to have substantive 
democratic shortfalls, not least with regard to participation and accountability. Ways 
of strengthening the democratic legitimacy of orchestration are identified. 
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The democratic legitimacy of orchestration: 
The UNFCCC, non-state actors, and transnational climate governance 
 
Introduction 
 
For almost a decade, states have struggled to craft a successor agreement to the Kyoto 
Protocol within the confines of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). Following the adoption of the 2009 Copenhagen Accord 
at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP), the multilateral climate regime was 
labeled as gridlocked: unable to produce a legally binding agreement with quantitative 
emission reduction targets for greenhouse gas emissions, states turned toward a weak 
set of voluntary pledges instead. Stalemate at Copenhagen meant attention shifted 
away from the inter-state bargaining process toward the wider climate landscape of 
initiatives by states, sub-state actors, and civil society (Hoffmann 2011).     
 In December of 2015, however, gridlock was overcome with the adoption of 
the widely heralded Paris Agreement that entered in to force on November 4th 2016 
(UNFCCC 2015b). Building on the Copenhagen Accord, the bedrock of the Paris 
Agreement is the voluntary ‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs) that rely 
upon states making commitments to reduce emissions, adapt to climate change, and 
provide finance. There are no legally binding targets for countries but rather a binding 
process for transparent review designed to make states ratchet up these commitments 
over time (Clemenson 2016, p. 7).  
Along with these NDCs, a crucial outcome of the Paris Agreement is that the 
UNFCCC has been consolidated as the central orchestrator of non-state actors and 
transnational initiatives in global climate governance. Orchestration is a strategy in 
which international organizations (IOs) and states mobilize intermediaries – private 
actors, civil society, transnational networks, and sub-state actors – to direct targets in 
the pursuit of key collective goals (Abbott et al. 2015a, Hale and Roger 2014). The 
solidification of the UNFCCC as orchestrator builds upon several years of activity by 
the Secretariat and state governments to coordinate, harness, and mobilize non-state 
actors (or, in the nomenclature of the Paris Agreement, non-party stakeholders).  
In particular, the Paris Agreement reflects a process whereby the UNFCCC 
Secretariat, by itself or jointly with states and other IOs, orchestrates various 
platforms of non-state climate commitments (Hale 2016). Likewise, the COP decision 
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annexed to the Paris Agreement authorized the appointment of two High-Level 
Champions with a full-time job to mobilize non-state climate action, and engage non-
state actors for the pre-2020 period (UNFCCC 2015c).1 To this end, the French 
Presidency of COP21 and the Moroccan Presidency of COP22 nominated each a 
senior diplomat for 2016-2018 culminating in the adoption of the Marrakech 
Partnership for Global Climate Action (GCA) (UNFCCC 2016a).  
Tracking these empirical developments, a vibrant literature has emerged 
focusing on how and why IOs engage orchestration as a mode of governance. Applied 
to climate governance, this work has looked at the mechanisms through which the 
UNFCCC Secretariat seeks to catalyze non-state action to put the world on track to 
limit global warming to well below 2 degrees, promote climate resilience, and push 
for de-carbonization (Chan et al. 2016; Chan et al. 2015, Hsu et al. 2015). The core 
question guiding this research is how to align non-state and intergovernmental action 
to achieve a low carbon future, focusing primarily on the effectiveness of 
orchestration to enlist intermediaries such as business, public-private partnerships, 
and cities to reach governance goals.  
Here, we focus on a different question: is orchestration democratically 
legitimate? In answering this question, we develop a framework anchored in 
‘democratic values’ – equal participation, deliberation, accountability, and 
transparency – for analyzing the legitimacy of orchestration. We engage in novel 
empirical analysis of two orchestration efforts undertaken by the UNFCCC 
Secretariat jointly with COP presidencies and the United Nation Secretary-General, 
namely the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) and the Non-state Actor Zone for 
Climate Action (NAZCA), which were further consolidated in GCA. We analyze 
these two orchestration mechanisms by applying the democratic values framework 
and find substantial shortcomings in participation, transparency, and accountability. 
We also find positive examples, though, which provide ways to make orchestration 
more democratically legitimate. 
Methodologically, this analysis amounts to an illustrative case-study that 
identifies, maps, and evaluates the democratic legitimacy of two orchestration efforts. 
The empirical material for this paper is based primarily on qualitative data, such as 
                                                        
1 Respectively, the High-Level Champion assigned by the French Presidency and the Moroccan 
Presidency are Laurence Tubiana and Hakima El Haıté. See http://www.cop22.ma/en/node/842 
(accessed 20 April 2017).  
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UNFCCC documents and official treaty texts, platforms of voluntary climate 
commitments, position papers, websites of different non-state actors, and summaries 
of sessions by the Earth Negotiation Bulletin. Moreover, a background for this paper 
is participatory observation and 50 semi-structured interviews with state and non-state 
actors at COP 19-21 and Bonn Intersessionals from the same time period.2  
The discussion moves forward in five stages. First, we define orchestration, 
expound previous research on the topic, and highlight the normative importance of 
linking orchestration with democratic legitimacy. Second, we detail our argument for 
attaining democratic legitimacy in orchestration through a focus on democratic 
values. Third, we conceptualize how the orchestrator-intermediaries-target 
relationship operates in the UNFCCC through “meta-intermediaries” of LPAA and 
NAZCA. Fourth, we assess to what extent these orchestration strategies by the 
UNFCCC live up to these democratic values. The conclusion discusses how state and 
non-state actors interact in climate governance and emphasizes the importance of 
building democratic legitimacy in the post-Paris regime. 
 
Orchestration and the Democratic Deficit 
 
Orchestration and Global Governance 
 
Global governance – the collection of formal and informal institutions that create, 
alter, and propagate the rules and norms dictating state and non-state interactions in 
world politics – is increasingly dense and complex. As a result of this complexity, 
states and IOs are steadily employing orchestration to solve collective action 
problems and manage global governance (Abbott et al. 2015a). Orchestration, as 
illustrated in Figure 1, can be conceptualized in terms of an Orchestrator-
Intermediary-Target (O-I-T) relationship. Here, orchestrators – such as IOs and states 
– seek to mobilize intermediaries – non-state actors, IGOs, transgovernmental 
networks, etc. – on a voluntary basis to impact targets in pursuit of a governance goal. 
Orchestration is indirect and soft as the IO addresses the ultimate targets – such as 
consumers, states, or firms – via intermediaries and because the orchestrator lacks 
hard control over this chain. Through this mode of governance, the orchestrator grants 
                                                        
2 Details on file with authors. 
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material and ideational resources to the intermediary party who can attempt to pursue 
their goals without binding restrictions from the orchestrator. Orchestrators often 
employ ‘meta-intermediaries’ – institutional mechanisms – that organize 
intermediaries. 
It is now widely recognized that orchestration is a key mode of global 
governance. Under what conditions is orchestration likely to emerge as a dominant 
strategy? Abbott et al. (2015a, p. 20ff) explicate a number of general and specific 
hypotheses to explain why an IO chooses orchestration instead of delegation. Factors 
such as limited orchestrator capability (the IO has low governance capacity but there 
is availability of multiple intermediaries) and strong orchestrator focality (the IOs is 
the uncontested and most legitimate actor in the field) explain the choice to engage 
orchestration. Moreover, orchestration is likely to emerge when there is goal 
divergence among member states (or between member states and IOs) and if member 
states have weak institutional control mechanisms.   
Given above explanations for the emergence of orchestration we argue that 
UNFCCC fits well with the orchestration theory. First, the UNFCCC has relative 
limited governance capacity in terms of staff and budget compared to other IOs. 
Second, there is a large availability of intermediaries in climate governance: 
transgovernmental networks, civil society, scientific and investors. Third, there is 
strong focality as UNFCCC remains the leading IO in global climate governance not 
least after the Paris Agreement. Fourth, there is a goal divergence among the Parties 
due the problem structure of climate change as a wicked problem with asymmetrical 
distribution of negative impacts of climate change and varying vulnerability to 
climate change.  
 
[Insert Figure: “Orchestration” about here] 
 
Global Governance and Democratic Legitimacy 
 
The growth of activity beyond the state has given risen to discussions over the 
democratic deficit of global (climate) governance. This work predominantly 
recognizes that the authority once confined within national borders increasingly 
escapes these traditional demarcations (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, p. 6). The 
democratic deficit arises because, while democratic institutions remain tied to nation-
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state boundaries, authority does not. Individuals are therefore affected by decisions 
that they have not had equal say in formulating. This directly undercuts the intrinsic 
value of democracy in which the people govern themselves.  
While much ink has been spilled describing the democratic deficit in global 
governance, recent scholarship has honed in on instrumental reasons why it should be 
mitigated. Not only is democracy an important source of legitimacy for modern 
governance, empirical work continues to show that democratic procedures promote 
better (epistemic) decision-making and generate greater compliance compared to 
other modes of governance (Kuyper 2015). A key finding from scholars of global 
governance is that democratic legitimacy matters for the performance of global 
governance institutions (Dingwerth 2007). Therefore the effectiveness of 
orchestration may relate systematically to the legitimacy of that governance 
arrangement in ways that require unpacking. Based on both intrinsic and instrumental 
reasons, we think there are good reasons to continue probing the democratic 
legitimacy of global governance. 
 
Orchestration and Democratic Legitimacy 
 
Although work on orchestration has focused myopically on effectiveness, the 
persistence and proliferation of this practice also raises normative questions such as 
those surrounding democratic legitimacy. At its core, democratic legitimacy is 
required so that individuals significantly affected by the use of authority have equal 
say in how that authority is used. Because the usage of orchestration by bodies such 
as the UNFCCC involves the exercise of public authority to achieve policy goals in 
ways that directly affect individuals, we argue that the decision to engage in 
orchestration by IOs and states, as well as the ongoing relationship between 
orchestrator-intermediary-target, should be democratically legitimated. The burden 
for ensuring the standards of democratic are maintained falls predominantly on the 
orchestrator. We discuss three specific reasons showing how orchestration generates 
demands of democratic legitimacy.  
First, the decision by IOs to engage in orchestration entails an act of public 
authority. The cornerstone of democratic legitimacy is that justifications for authority 
should be offered to those affected by that rule-making. Orchestration by the 
UNFCCC Secretariat necessitates the creation of policies and rules surrounding how 
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orchestration efforts should be created, managed, and assessed. The Secretariat 
therefore uses its authority to forge rules, expend resources, and shape the practices of 
intermediaries and, by extension, the effects on targets. Given that the Secretariat uses 
its authority to take these steps, the decision to engage in orchestration requires 
legitimation. 
Second, it might be argued that orchestration does not trigger a demand for 
democratic legitimacy because the authority of the UNFCCC Secretariat is delegated 
from states which are, in turn, democratically legitimated at the national level. There 
are, however, several problems with this claim (for a similar argument, see Moravcsik 
2004). Although the UNFCCC has 197 member states, many of them do not qualify 
as democratic, therefore removing their citizens from the chain of delegation. 
Relatedly, the authority exercised by international bureaucracies is increasingly 
removed from delegation chains through processes of agency slack in which agents 
carve out space to exercise authority beyond that which was delegated to them 
(Johnson 2013). This also severs individuals from the exercise of authority.   
Perhaps more directly, though, the practice of orchestration breaks chains of 
delegation between citizens who empower states and IOs with the activities of 
intermediaries that are recognized, mobilized, and even sanctioned by the 
orchestrator. Orchestrated governance is soft and the orchestrator does not have final 
say over intermediaries and their activities. Resultantly, there is no delegated 
authority that can be taken back by the IO or state governments. This lack of 
delegation places the democratic legitimacy of orchestration at the fore. This is a 
point recognized in a recent article by Kenneth Abbott and his co-authors (2015b) as 
they highlight the legitimacy complications engendered by orchestration. Abbott et al. 
(2015b, p. 9) claim that orchestration, in contrast to delegation, ‘cuts the chain of 
electoral accountability because the orchestrator lacks hard control over 
intermediaries. Ultimately, intermediaries exercise their authority in an (externally) 
uncontrolled and unaccountable way.’ As a result, they contend that this form of 
governance ‘cannot simply be subsumed under delegation, but demands its own form 
of analysis.’ We agree with this point and suggest that because orchestration cuts the 
ties between national constituents on one hand and intermediaries and targets on the 
other, the decision to engage in orchestration requires democratic legitimation. 
Finally, some instances of orchestration entail activities by intermediaries 
which impact significantly upon targets. While not all orchestration efforts will reach 
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this bar, those by the UNFCCC discussed in this article do. Both LPAA and NAZCA, 
which provide organizing platforms for intermediaries, are endorsed in the COP 
decision to the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015c). Moreover, the UNFCCC, through 
the two High Level Champions, maintains that the activities of intermediaries will be 
essential to close the 14-17 gigaton emission gap as states strive toward a less than 2-
degree pathway.3 The decision to undertake orchestration by the UNFCCC provides 
resources and recognition to intermediaries as well as legitimates their activities. 
Given that the Secretariat employs public authority to maintain orchestration 
platforms, as well as highlights the importance of these efforts in supporting NDCs 
(UNFCCC 2016a), it is essential that the intermediary activities contribute clearly to 
the core goal of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.  
Taken together, these points highlight why the democratic credentials of 
orchestration should be taken seriously. The use of authority by the orchestrator, as 
well as potential impacts of intermediaries, places a burden on the orchestrator to 
ensure that the decision to use authority to engage in orchestration, as well as ongoing 
intermediary efforts, live up to democratic standards.  
 
Towards Democratic Legitimacy Beyond the State: A Democratic Values 
Approach 
 
How should we assess democratic legitimacy beyond the state, especially in the 
context of orchestration? We suggest that adopting a ‘democratic values’ approach is 
fruitful. Building on work such as Dingwerth (2007), this approach seeks to remedy 
the global democratic deficit by enhancing and deepening a set of democratic values 
in formal and informal institutions. In this way the democratization of climate 
governance can be seen as a set of values that that are more or less met. We can 
evaluate how orchestration fares in terms of each value and then prescribe ways to 
enhance these values. 
 We recognize there are other ways to think about the democratization of 
climate governance. For instance, different scholars have focused on an 
intergovernmental approach (Keohane et al. 2009), a stakeholder model (Macdonald 
                                                        
3 See: 
http://unfccc.int/files/paris_agreement/application/pdf/marrakech_partnership_for_global_climate_acti
on.pdf (accessed 20 April 2017).  
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2008), or deliberative democratization (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014). While these 
models all have their relative merits, we choose to adopt the ‘democratic values 
approach’ for two key reasons. First, given orchestration is a relatively new 
phenomenon, it is important to have an open conceptualization about how democracy 
might be pursued under these conditions. Second, recent literature has stressed that 
thinking about democratization in terms of a set of values helps make clear that 
potential trade-offs and symbiosis between those values (Dingwerth 2014).  
The key question is then which democratic values should different actors 
pursue and promote? In assessing the democratic legitimacy of orchestration 
strategies we focus on participation, deliberation, accountability, and transparency. 
We focus on these values because have they reflect several prominent traditions in 
democratic thinking, such participatory, deliberative, and liberal models. Moreover 
taken together these values uphold the core of democracy by providing individuals 
control over authority which significantly affects their life by participating in how that 
authority is used, demanding justifications, and holding power-wielders accountable 
in light of transparent information. We measure how well each value is instantiated on 
a four-fold range: ‘significant’ presence, ‘limited’ presence, ‘nascent’ presence, and 
‘absent’ (see Table 3). The empirical case is then judged against these idealized 
democratic values.  
Participation means that citizens affected by the exercise of authority should 
have the opportunity and ability to be involved in how that authority is wielded. This 
entails equal capacity to set the agenda as well as shape the rules, laws, and 
regulations that will affect their lives. We recognize that equality of participation may 
often rest upon forms of representation as individuals cannot always be directly 
involved in all decision-making processes. National representatives or self-appointed 
representatives (interest groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), etc.) can all 
help connect individuals with sites of authority (Macdonald 2008). Precisely how 
equal participation is secured will and should vary depending upon the institutional 
scheme in need of democratic regulation, in this case orchestration.  
Deliberation provides those affected by decisions with a rationale for how 
rules are being formulated and applied in various contexts (Habermas 1996). This 
value derives largely from work in the field of deliberative democracy that stresses 
the importance of providing reciprocal and generalizable arguments for how authority 
is exercised and how it is connected to the public use of reasoning. Reciprocity means 
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that justification is mutually acceptable to parties in a deliberation, whereas 
generalizability connotes a set of reasons that could be shared by affected parties due 
to shared institutional or moral structures. Deliberation also means that 
representatives of those affected have an opportunity to put their reasons forward and 
have a response.  
Accountability, in a democratic sense, means that those affected by decision-
making should have the right to hold power wielders ‘to a set of standards, to judge 
whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to 
impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met’ 
(Grant and Keohane 2005). This criterion, following liberal conceptions of 
democracy, gives affected individuals the opportunity to hold decision-makers at 
different levels of governance accountable for their actions and stop the arbitrary 
exercise of authority that can undercut individual autonomy. Operative accountability 
mechanisms provide an ex ante incentive for decision-makers to take consideration of 
how affected parties will react to decisions being made in their name.  
Finally, in order for accountability to be meaningfully enacted, transparency 
is required. We conceptualize transparency as the means of disclosure of actions taken 
by public actors and institutions. Transparency should be offered to those affected by 
decisions. Although it does not require third party monitoring, transparency is often 
promoted and enhanced by demands for information. Several scholars have claimed 
that accountability can only be democratically useful if transparent information is 
available (Peixoto 2013). Due to the close connections between accountability and 
transparency, we analyze these values together.  
 
[Insert “Table 1: Standards for Assessing Democratic Legitimacy” about here] 
 
UNFCCC and Non-State Actors in Climate Governance: From Regulation to 
Orchestration 
 
The regime complex of climate governance comprises state governments, the 
UNFCCC, other IOs (such as the HLPF on sustainable development), NGOs, PPPs, 
transgovernmental networks, and much more. Within this complex, the UNFCCC has 
stood at the center of efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and other 
anthropogenic interferences with the global climate system for more than 20 years. 
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Up until Copenhagen, the strategy for addressing climate change was a top-down 
‘targets and timetable’ approach administered through the Kyoto Protocol. Gridlock at 
COP15 resulted in the Copenhagen Accord which paved the way for a bottom-up 
‘pledge-and-review’ process whereby industrialized states submitted their voluntary 
pledges for climate mitigation through Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions. 
COP15 thus fundamentally changed climate diplomacy by shifting from centralized 
bargaining to national plans aligned with the varying state interests (Falkner 2016).  
This bottom-up logic was reinforced at subsequent UN climate summits in 
Cancun, Durban, and Warsaw. In the wake of the 2014 Lima COP, all states were 
asked to begin submitting intended NDCs. The Paris Agreement formalized this 
pledge-and-review system of voluntary commitments by establishing five-year 
‘global stocktakes’ of NDCs coupled with a transparency framework – which engages 
non-state actors – for assessing the comparability of these pledges in an effort to 
ratchet up ambitions (UNFCCC 2015b). Along with these changes, the UNFCCC has 
constructed meta-intermediaries in an effort to move from regulation to orchestration 
(Abbott and Bernstein 2015). In this article, we focus on two of these efforts: NAZCA 
and LPAA. In doing so, we exclude databases, registries and platforms of initiatives 
that are not orchestrated by the UN (Bulkeley et al. 2014).4 We also limit ourselves to 
climate commitments, noting however that they overlap with numerous orchestrating 
attempts such UN voluntary commitments for sustainable development.5  
At COP20 in Lima, the COP Presidencies of Peru and France, in tandem with 
the Executive Office of the United Nation Secretary-General and the UNFCCC 
Secretariat, launched the LPAA intended to scale-up and showcase non-state climate 
action. The LPAA – which was framed as the ‘fourth pillar’ of COP21 alongside 
mitigation, adaptation and finance – fulfills the function of showcasing initiatives, 
enhancing ambition, and tracking and reporting of non-state actions. At COP21 in 
Paris 75 LPAA initiatives were highlighted through a series of high-level thematic 
events or 7 ‘Action days’. In order to be showcased under the LPAA banner certain 
criteria has to be fulfilled for initiatives such as short-term operational goals, 
implementation capacity, and science based targets. COP21 formally recognized the 
results of LPAA and decided that a high-level event dedicated for non-state action 
                                                        
4 http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/Welcome (accessed 15 February 2016). 
5 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnerships (accessed 15 February 2016). 
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should be convened at each COP until 2020. The GCA adopted in Marrakech 
represents a continuity of LPAA(UNFCCC 2016b). 
 Alongside LPAA, the NAZCA platform was launched at the COP20. It is an 
online portal and aggregator of climate actions from sub-state and non-state actors. 
Operated by the UNFCCC Secretariat it contains more than 12000 individual and 
cooperative initiatives. Commitments are supposed to have relevance, scale, 
specificity in terms of quantifiable outcomes, transparency in tracking progress, and 
ownership to qualify for NAZCA (UNFCCC 2016a). Amongst others, UNEP, the 
CDP, the UN Global Compact and Carbonn are supposed to monitor contributions 
NAZCA by tracking and assessing data. The NAZCA website was refurbished at 
COP22 in Marrakech and a ‘Yearbook of climate action’ as reporting mechanism was 
proposed. Under the GCA, there is an ongoing debate whether NAZCA should 
remain a permanent platform for compiling, registering, and tracking non-state action 
according to fulfillment of specific criteria with a more rigorous reporting, monitoring 
and verification (UNFCCC 2016a)    
 We argue that NAZCA and LPAA can be conceived as instruments 
orchestrated by multilateral institutions to catalyze new non-state and sub-state 
initiatives where needed, support weak organizations and vulnerable regions, 
strengthen ambition and scale-up climate action to ensure that the mitigation gap is 
closed. These are steps towards stronger linkages between multilateral negotiations 
and the sphere of transnational action (Chan et al. 2016, Hale 2016). 
 
Orchestrator-Intermediary-Target and the UNFCCC 
 
As previously discussed, orchestration can be systematically described in terms of the 
O-I-T relationship. How does the O-I-T relationship operate in the LPAA and 
NAZCA, and what are tools of orchestration employed by UNFCCC? 
Orchestrator: As detailed in Table 2, the orchestrator for LPAA was a 
‘quartet’ of the Peruvian and French COP Presidencies, the UNFCCC and the United 
Nation Secretary-General. NAZCA, in a slightly different vein, is hosted by the 
UNFCCC Secretariat and is designed to improve the visibility of initiatives for 
mitigating carbon emissions. In both instances, the High-Level Champions are 
important tools for orchestration intend to scale-up, showcase, and assess non-state 
initiatives through a roadmap for global climate action (UNFCCC 2016b). We 
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differentiate between ‘high-level’ or summitry orchestration from other orchestration 
mechanisms that rely on a ‘bottom-up’ pledging and self-reporting by non-state actors 
in the form of registries or platforms: The LPAA constitutes an instance of high-level 
orchestration while the NAZCA platform relies on voluntary bottom-up reporting of 
actions, commitments, and pledges by actors.  
Intermediaries: Orchestration aims to identify, enlist, support, or even create 
intermediaries that have goals aligned with orchestrator as well as capabilities to 
address targets, such as states and private entities. Compared to many other policy 
fields, climate governance has a large availability of intermediaries such as 
businesses, cities, transgovernmental networks, and scientists. The lead up to the Paris 
Agreement meant the creation of new intermediaries by orchestrators, or rather what 
Abbott and Bernstein (2015, p. 229) coin meta-intermediaries, i.e. transnational actors 
that act as standard-setters of standard-setters. As illustrated in Figure 1, NAZCA and 
LPAA represent an umbrella for a diversity of non-state, and sub-state actors to 
commit climate action according to specified criteria by the orchestrators, such that 
actions needed to be grounded in science, have a demonstrable impact, and bring 
about transformative change toward carbon neutrality. LPAA and NAZCA are 
thereby instruments to increase intermediary availability: since the 2014 Lima 
summit, thousands of new initiatives have been registered in NAZCA. 
Targets: At the end of the orchestration chain are states, private bodies, civil 
society actors, and individuals who are addressed by orchestrators through 
intermediaries (see Table 2 and Figure 1). Orchestration can either serve to create 
common rules for the conducts of states or serve as substitute or complement for state 
action by promoting regulation of private conduct of non-state actors, or by providing 
public good and services (Abbott et al 2016, p. 6). Orchestration through LPAA and 
NAZCA captures very much the second function as a complement to state action. 
Many of the initiatives in LPAA revolve around service provision, for example 
accelerating climate finance and providing clean energy (International Solar alliance, 
Africa Renewable Energy Initiative, Global Geothermal Alliance) or energy 
efficiency (Global Energy Efficiency Accelerator). LPAA and NAZCA, then, seek to 
direct the efforts of a plethora of actors on the ground. 
 
Typology of Orchestration 
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Table 2 below typologizes the two mechanisms orchestrated by the UNFCCC 
Secretariat. These mechanisms are tools to support, steer, and mobilize intermediaries 
toward de-carbonization (Abbott and Bernstein 2015). While this article focuses on 
non-state actors, the various registries and platforms surveyed below encompass 
governments, intergovernmental networks and public-private partnerships. The 
intermediaries are the various private and public actors, or constellations of actors 
from business, local authorities and civil society. These actors sign-up voluntarily and 
are enlisted through a number of orchestration mechanisms as illustrated in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Table 2: “Orchestration in the UNFCCC ” about here] 
 
The Orchestration of Non-State Climate Governance: Democratic Legitimacy 
  
We now assess what LPAA and NAZCA mean for the democratization of 
orchestrated climate governance. Before undertaking this analysis, we recognize a 
methodological challenge in our assessment. Since the non-state initiatives are found 
in a number of registries, we cannot assess the potential of all individual initiatives or 
pledges. Instead we often rely on meta-analyses assessing the aggregate effects of 
these initiatives (Chan et al. 2016; Hsu et al. 2015). We argue that these meta-
assessments combined with our own empirical analysis of NAZCA and LPAA are 
sufficient to evaluate the democratic legitimacy of these orchestration efforts.  
 
Participation (and representation) of non-state actors  
 
Which non-state actors participate and who is represented in LPAA and NAZCA? To 
measure participation, we use the range of different types of non-state actors or, 
framed in UNFCCC terminology, nine constituencies that can participate. These 
groups are: environmental NGOs, business, indigenous people, women, trade unions, 
local governments, science and technology communities, farmers, and youth. We 
supplement this by looking at the split between global North and global South 
participation. 
To begin, LPAA is a high-level initiative orchestrated by the quartet 
mentioned previously. The 77 climate commitments from various actors under the 
LPAA umbrella have been showcased through events at COPs aimed at mobilizing 
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non-state climate action. For accredited non-state observers at COPs, which amounted 
to more than 8200 participants at Paris, the LPAA action days and thematic events 
were open for participation to non-state actors from all nine constituencies. Moreover, 
representatives of constituencies such as environmental NGOs, indigenous people, 
and the science community were invited to speak at sessions.  
The UN climate summit in Morocco at COP22 focused on continuation of the 
LPAA through its successor – Global Climate Action. In their submissions to the 
GCA Roadmap, many observers and parties have moved beyond the efforts in Paris to 
call for more balanced participation to represent the diversity of non-state actors, such 
as indigenous people, women, but also underrepresented actors such as business in 
developing countries (WRI 2016; UNFCCC 2016b).    
In these ways, LPAA seeks to galvanize non-state actor networks, IOs, and 
states in their commitments to both NAZCA and NDCs. This practice of ratcheting up 
commitments through LPAA has occurred throughout 2015 at the June ‘Business 
Summit’ in Paris, the July ‘Climate and Territories World Summit’ in Lyon, the 
September ‘World Water Week’ in Stockholm, and the October ‘Cool Earth Summit’ 
in Japan. The LPAA covers non-state actor initiatives in 12 thematic areas as diverse 
as forestry management, agriculture, transport, the building sector, private finance, 
short-lived climate pollutants, cities, and renewable energy. General concepts such as 
‘resilience’ and ‘innovation’ are strung throughout different areas of concrete action.  
Based on these efforts, we argue that LPAA is significantly inclusive and 
equitable as it reflects a multi-stakeholder logic. This speaks in favor of the 
participatory quality of high-level orchestration efforts as the orchestrator (in this 
case, the UNFCCC) has been able to build and sustain the LPAA which gives a range 
of non-state actors access to set the agenda for future UNFCCC and state efforts.  
The NAZCA portal, a bottom-up orchestration effort, contains more than 
12500 individual commitments and numerous cooperative initiatives under various 
LPAA themes that are jointly undertaken by subnational actors and firms. Generally 
speaking, we identify three problems that emerge in terms of equal participation for 
NAZCA. First, as an open initiative, the geographical participation of non-state actors 
is unevenly distributed. We coded all 12522 NAZCA contributions based on the home 
country in which the contribution is registered. From this, we estimate that 87.1% of 
the contributions come from the Global North (n = 10907) while only 12.9% come 
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from the Global South (n = 1615).6 This is complicated by the fact that many of the 
contributions come from actors that have networks spanning the North-South divide, 
but it still indicates that the lead is being taken in the North and not led by actors in 
the South. This figure is roughly confirmed by the Galvanizing the Groundswell of 
Climate Actions (2015) report which finds that 84% of the contributions to NAZCA 
come from OECD countries.  
Second, the non-state actors who document commitments are self-selected. 
Because it is an ‘opt-in’ scheme, actors have to fit within one of the existing NAZCA 
categories. While these groupings are important, they are far from comprehensive 
with issues such as marine transport missing (although the global freight initiative 
may have some scope for marine transport mitigation7). This is important because the 
burden to ensure inclusive orchestration efforts falls on the UNFCCC in their role as 
orchestrator. The Secretariat should be employing orchestration in ways that set open 
agendas and mobilize wide-ranging support, rather than limiting the agenda and 
scope.  
Third, there is no mechanism to ensure that the included commitments 
actually respond to the preferences and interests of affected parties. For instance, the 
Kellogg Company documents a wide array of affected parties who are considered in 
their NAZCA commitment (Kellogg Business 2015). In contrast, many of the private 
financing initiatives – such as the green bonds – provides little to no information 
about how these bonds will impact (or respond to) the needs of those affected by 
investment in different sectors (Climate Bonds 2015). This problem has recently 
become more acute as it becomes clear that actors who have committed to divestment 
and sustainability practices listed with NAZCA – such as Credit Suisse – provide 
multi-billion dollar loans to companies engaged in Palm Oil extraction and thus 
deforestation.8 Given that these companies gain legitimacy from participation in the 
NAZCA portal and yet act in ways that undermine the Paris Agreement, the 
UNFCCC should be held responsible for the effects of their orchestration efforts as 
they impact local and indigenous people on the ground.  
On balance, then, we suggest that LPAA and NAZCA can offer inclusive and 
                                                        
6 Coding on file with authors. 
7 See http://www.globalgreenfreight.org/ (accessed 20 April 2017).  
8 See http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/business/energy-environment/how-big-banks-are-putting-
rain-forests-in-peril.html?_r=0%20and%20https://www.cdp.net/en/responses/5834 (accessed 20 April 
2017). 
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participatory processes. Accordingly, LPAA is equitable in terms of including a range 
of non-state actor positions and even includes selection criteria to ensure accepted 
proposals are science-based, ambitious, inclusive, and possible to monitor.9 However 
since both orchestration efforts contain pre-determined categories, only intermediaries 
that can comply with these categorization efforts can be included. This has the effect 
of limiting the agenda setting power of intermediaries and affected parties as the rules 
are set by the orchestrator.  
 
Deliberation 
 
How can deliberation be secured under orchestration so affected individuals can 
receive and contest justifications for decision-making by both the UNFCCC as 
orchestrator and the policies of intermediaries? On both points, it is clear that 
NAZCA and LPAA come up short, though again with LPAA faring better.  
Starting with LPAA, this process fares reasonably well in terms of deliberative 
justification for two reasons: its multi-stakeholder design and clearer criteria of 
inclusion, and we discuss both in turn. First, this mode of high-level orchestration to 
mobilize civil society is an established practice in UN diplomacy since the first UN 
Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 (Abbott and Bernstein 2015). 
The LPAA thematic events at Paris COP21 offered venues for deliberation between 
governments and societal stakeholders. In the submissions for the Roadmap for 
Global Climate Action in advance of COP22, both parties and observers stressed the 
need to enhance dialogue between business, civil society, and subnational actors at 
and between COPs. These events have offered more direct justifications to some 
elements of civil society though, as with NAZCA, these justifications are not 
systematically offered to affected parties. This is because justifications in these fora 
are limited to accredited observer organizations at the COP or those who are able to 
view the webcasts.  
Second, the UNFCCC has publicized and justified the criteria for LPAA 
inclusion and tailored these criteria according to the type of participation (such as 
contributions by states, cities, business, and civil society). These criteria comprise 
justificatory demands such as monitoring and reporting on a regular basis, 
                                                        
9 http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/join-lpaa/#Criteria (accessed 20 April 2017). 
18 
 
demonstrating capacity to deliver on commitments, showcasing contributions in 
public ways, and “observ[ing] inclusiveness (e.g. balance regional representation).”10 
Alternately, NAZCA discussed in the next section, only made its criteria for inclusion 
available in the GCA launched at Marrakesh (UNFCCC 2016a). As such, we find 
several positive efforts at justification by the UNFCCC and LPAA intermediaries.  
The same cannot be said of NAZCA as the quality and level of justifications 
in the commitments by intermediaries under this bottom up orchestration effort vary 
widely: Some non-state actors provide fairly comprehensive timelines to reach their 
commitments (for instance Kellogg and the city initiatives through the Covenant of 
Mayors), while others provide only minimal justifications for their actions. And there 
is little oversight by the UNFCCC to ensure that these justifications are diffused 
widely. As noted on the NAZCA portal, all commitments are documented, but only ‘a 
small sample of the data’ is released publicly (NAZCA 2015). In another example of 
this lack of justification, in order to view the NAZCA commitments for many 
companies, individuals have to register with the CDP and obtain approval from the 
organization to view commitments in detail (NAZCA CDP 2015). While the CDP 
does monitor these contributions, collect data, and publicize results, they do not 
aggregate the NAZCA data, nor are there sanctions for contributors who fail to report 
adequately. While there is a percentage ranking indicating how complete an annual 
report from a contributor is, the CDP explicitly says that a missing score does not 
indicate a lack of environmental impact, but may be a reporting error. This means that 
in-depth justifications about commitment levels, strategies, and outputs are 
substantially obscured from affected parties.  
There are also few ways for the UNFCCC to monitor the implementation of 
NAZCA commitments. The decision by the UNFCCC to establish a bottom-up portal 
that they do not (or even cannot) monitor closely has not been directly justified by the 
UNFCCC. This is important because establishing NAZCA entails the use of public 
authority and it makes it difficult for affected individuals to understand how these 
actions could be seen as a credible commitment for tackling climate change. Because 
the COP decision to the Paris Agreement refers to both LPAA and NAZCA efforts as 
critical for ensuring that state commitments are ratcheted up over time, this gap must 
be taken seriously. By engaging a process of orchestration that stretches chains from 
                                                        
10 See the criteria at http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/join-lpaa/ (accessed 20 April 2017). 
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the Secretariat on to the intermediary and then to watchdogs, it becomes clear that 
both the Secretariat and intermediaries are able to circumvent their duty to justify 
their activities. As states seek to reach the goals of the Paris Agreement and the 
UNFCCC employs orchestration in this pursuit, justifying both the criteria for 
NAZCA inclusion and the activities of intermediaries would increase democratic 
legitimacy and make it clearer where implementation gaps exist.  
Ultimately, then, the level of deliberative quality offered by the UNFCCC 
both for and within NAZCA and the LPAA varies substantially. Justifications range 
considerably in depth and quality, but affected actors are excluded from both 
intermediary goals and the monitoring of orchestrated targets by the UNFCCC under 
NAZCA. Due to the clearer criteria under LPAA individual actors can more clearly 
understand the justifications for inclusion and action of intermediaries. As 
orchestration becomes an increasingly important governance practice directed by the 
UNFCCC to include and manage non-state actors, these shortcomings of deliberative 
legitimacy should be taken seriously.  
 
Accountability and Transparency  
 
As transparency and accountability are inextricably linked, we treat them in a single 
sub-section (however we disaggregate the two values in our matrix below). An 
important precondition for holding actors accountable is the availability and access to 
information through public disclosure (Bäckstrand 2008, Peixoto 2013). Without 
transparency, monitoring and tracking of progress, the aggregate impact of non-state 
commitments will be hampered which will, in turn, weaken accountability of both the 
UNFCCC and intermediaries. Resultantly, strengthening transparency and 
accountability of the broader range of non-state climate action has become a leitmotif 
of both the High-Level Champions in the roadmap climate action as well as in most 
submissions both from Parties and observers.  
In terms of democratic legitimacy, it is important that accountability and 
transparency of LPAA and NAZCA are offered to affected individuals. Transparency 
and accountability are, in the words of the WRI (2016, p. 3), therefore critical to 
‘establish credibility and legitimacy of the Action Agenda, and to build trust among 
the stakeholder involved’. Accountability can be achieved through non-state 
mechanisms that monitor, compare, and review the ambitions of NDCs in ways 
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sensitive to affected individuals, by considering their views and providing them with 
information. The important role of civil society and research organizations outside the 
UNFCCC to assess whether non-state commitments fulfill their own targets are 
emphasized by several parties.11 These mechanisms can work to both positively 
sanction good effort from frontrunners and negatively sanction laggards through 
naming and shaming. 
Accountability should then be seen as an important means by which the 
performance, progress, and implementation of non-state initiatives can be measured 
and linked to affected stakeholders. Accountability mechanisms in orchestration 
operate at two tiers. First, accountability is made possible if there are mechanisms to 
track whether the aggregate effect of climate actions in a registry help achieve climate 
goals. Here, the role of an orchestrator should be to set up appropriate mechanisms to 
ensure clarity, credibility, comparability, and transformative potential of climate 
commitments to affected parties. To that end the High-Level Champions have called 
for tracking of non-climate initiatives to examine if their targets are consistent with 
the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement and demonstrate their transformational 
potential (UNFCCC 2016a). The second tier of accountability relates to the varying 
accountability mechanisms for the climate actions in the registries of LPAA and 
NAZCA, and whether affected individuals can view and sanction these efforts. We 
discuss both tiers of accountability, i.e. how accountability can be enhanced through 
NAZCA and the LPAA employed by orchestrators, and the accountability of 
intermediary efforts.  
A common theme in many of the recent reports on non-state climate 
commitments is the chronic lack of – and need for – stronger transparency and 
accountability (Chan et al. 2015, Hsu et al. 2015). A structural problem related to the 
various registries is that submission and reporting on initiatives occur on a voluntary 
basis and by means of self-description by various corporate, sub-state, and civil 
society actors. Yet the accountability of both LPAA and NAZCA are significantly 
lacking as the orchestrator is still in the process of setting up benchmarking, review 
procedures, or monitoring mechanisms so that stakeholders and governments can 
track process, compare performance, and identify best practices among the different 
                                                        
11 This is reflected in the submissions by many parties and observers as well as in the synthesis report 
of the High-Level Champions (2016c), http://unfccc.int/documentation/items/9636.php (accessed 20 
April 2017). 
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initiatives (UNFCCC 2016c). With the emergence of the GCA, this lack of 
accountability and transparency has been officially recognized as the High-Level 
champions note: ‘We need to help non-Party stakeholders achieve the recognition 
they seek. At the same time, we owe it to the integrity of the UNFCCC process to 
make sure that these initiatives and coalitions achieve the targets they set for 
themselves; that these targets are truly consistent with the long-term goals of the Paris 
Agreement; and that the participants in initiatives and coalitions are actually doing 
what it takes to achieve the commitments they made.’12  
To be sure, during the early stages of NAZCA and the LPAA, the CDP and 
the Carbonn Climate Registry undertook data tracking of these initiatives. By 
December of 2015, this had expanded to include: The Climate Group, Investors on 
Climate Change, the UN Global Compact, Covenant of Mayors, and Climate Bonds 
Initiative (UNFCCC 2015a). By the commencement of COP21 in Paris, there were 
over 10500 commitments from a host of cities, regions, companies, investors, and 
NGOs. In the COP21 decision annexed to the Paris Agreement, LPAA and NAZCA 
are mentioned as important mechanisms for non-party stakeholders to scale-up their 
climate actions to 2020 (UNFCCC 2015c, para 177-121). However, as discussed 
previously, the UNFCCC is only now taking steps to ensure that NAZCA 
commitments and LPAA goals are being justified to individuals, that data is easily 
accessible, or that affected individuals can contest the goals of intermediaries or the 
UNFCCC’s orchestration efforts.  
 In this vein, many initiatives under LPAA and NAZCA lack quantifiable long-
term goals and targets, screening, and monitoring mechanisms. A precondition for 
holding actors accountable for their climate actions is clear, quantifiable, and 
measurable targets. However, only a third of the 77 cooperative initiatives under the 
LPAA have mitigation targets (Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Action 2015, 
p. 10).  
Weak accountability is problematic given that non-state initiatives in NAZCA 
and the LPAA are framed as complementary or even compensatory mechanisms for 
lack of governmental action and multilateral action on climate change. However, 
there are many sobering accounts of the prospect of non-state action to reduce the 
                                                        
12 See http://newsroom.unfccc.int/climate-action/global-climate-action-agenda (accessed 20 April 
2017). 
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emission gap and contribute to low carbon society. Several studies point to the 
problems of ‘additionality’ and ‘double accounting’ of national pledges and 
international initiatives. This refers to overlap between governments’ national climate 
plans and their registered pledges and participation in NAZCA and LPAA (Chan et 
al. 2015, Hsu et al. 2015).  
However, since initiatives encompass a diversity of actors, networks, and 
coalitions – elected mayors, investors, civil society, companies and regional 
governments – accountability mechanisms may be in place for individual initiatives. 
Electoral and non-electoral accountability may operate in initiatives, for example 
mayors are held accountable by citizens, corporations by their stakeholders, and civil 
society organizations by their members. It seems plausible, though, that public 
scrutiny of the UNFCCC decision to engage in orchestration, as well as the activities 
of intermediaries, will also help curtail some of the governance gaps noted in current 
studies. Public accountability and transparency will increase the number of actors 
who can monitor intermediary efforts and report on non-compliance. It will likewise 
pressure the UNFCCC to monitor intermediaries more carefully as they construct 
criteria for inclusion and repeatedly claim that these efforts are essential in reaching 
the lofty goals of the Paris Agreement. 
But ultimately there are many shortcomings in how orchestrated contributions 
are being measured in practice and a lack of ability for affected individuals to a) hold 
the UNFCCC accountable for failing to ensure that initiatives do not overlap, or b) 
hold intermediaries to account for failing to realize their commitments or take 
consideration for how their actions do or do not impact affected actors on the ground. 
For these reasons we label both LPAA and NAZCA as having nascent or even absent 
accountability and transparency mechanisms in place. However, the adoption of the 
Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action indicates that questions of 
transparency, tracking, and accountability of climate action will increasingly be 
addressed (UNFCCC 2016b).   
 
Summarizing Democratic Potential and Pitfalls 
 
Table 3 summarizes how democratic values stack up in existing orchestration 
attempts by the UNFCCC. First, we see a difference between high-level orchestration 
mechanisms (LPAA) through multi-stakeholder diplomacy and ‘bottom-up 
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orchestration’ (NAZCA) through registries and platforms for non-state actions. The 
high-level orchestration undertaken by state parties and Secretariats jointly – where 
pledging takes place in conjunction with COPs– engage and mobilize a broader range 
of stakeholders from business, civil society, and municipalities in different 
geographical regions. In terms of balanced participation of different groups of non-
state actors, then, LPAA scores better than NAZCA. But it is worth re-iterating that 
this situation is changing as the High-Level Champions call for more balanced and 
diverse participation in both LPAA and NAZCA in the GCA Roadmap (UNFCCC 
2016b). But at this stage the high-level orchestration provides a venue for deliberation 
of voluntary pledges by cities, corporations and coalition or networks of actors as 
these are publically justified and debated. This ‘pledging diplomacy’ and showcasing 
runs the risk of being ‘green washing’. And we are wary that high-level summits may 
contain a trade-off: it is easier to obtain a good spread of civil society actors by 
drawing upon accredited bodies within the UNFCCC, but this runs the risk of 
disregarding affected actors on the ground who are not accredited at official events. 
Still orchestration through summits entails an open, inclusive and deliberative 
process, in which actors can be held accountable for their (in)actions.  
In contrast, the bottom-up character of NAZCA in which non-state actors 
submit their pledges is less balanced in terms of participation – and heavily skewed 
toward state and sub-state actors and governmental partnerships in the global North. . 
Since the UNFCCC Secretariat only provides limited guiding principles, templates, or 
screening of what constitutes a ‘climate action’ or ‘cooperative initiative’ for 
NAZCA, it includes all kind of actions related to climate change, and encompasses 
any type of actor. Transparency and accountability in these types of orchestration 
mechanisms are also nascent of non-existent as there is insufficient screening, lack of 
criteria for what qualifies as a climate target and quantitative targets with respect to 
greenhouse gas reductions, and weak monitoring mechanism for assessing targets by 
affected stakeholders.  
 
[Insert Table 3: “Democratic values in orchestration” about here] 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has had two main objectives. Theoretically we have shed light on the 
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neglected normative dimension of orchestration, in this case, its democratic 
legitimacy. Although delegation (in terms of principal-agent models) can rely 
predominantly on chains of accountability that give some affected individuals control 
of IO decisions, orchestration does not fit this mold. Indeed the entire concept has 
arisen from the recognition that IOs, states, and other public bodies are exerting their 
authority through soft modes of governance (steering other actors, mobilizing new 
efforts, even helping to craft 3rd party rules). We have fleshed out the democratic 
problem related to orchestration, showed its importance at the interface of UN climate 
diplomacy and non-state action, and taken stock of how different democratic values – 
participation, deliberation, accountability, and transparency – fare in recent 
orchestration attempts.  
Our empirical findings suggest that the fulfillment of democratic values varies 
between individual or joint orchestration attempts undertaken by Secretariats of the 
UNFCCC and the UN Secretary-General and COP presidencies, coinciding with the 
division we denote between high-level orchestration and bottom-up orchestration. 
High-level efforts, exemplified by the LPAA, promote more balanced participation 
and deliberative processes compared to bottom-up orchestration found in various 
overlapping registries, platforms, and databases for non-state climate commitments 
such as NAZCA. However, for the two orchestration attempts by the UN surveyed, 
transparency and accountability mechanisms are nascent at best or non-existent at 
worse. There is very limited possibility for affected individuals to track the 
environmental additionality, performance, and effectiveness of these non-state 
initiatives thus obscuring decisions and decision-making from individuals.  
 Second this argument has limitations, which, simultaneously, provide future 
directions for research. We have taken a first cut at evaluating the democratic 
legitimacy of orchestration. Further work is required to determine the trade-offs 
between these values and to assess how feasible these values are given the limited 
resources of the UNFCCC Secretariat and the difficulties of securing compliance. 
Empirically we have only undertaken analysis within the field of climate governance. 
It remains an open question whether orchestration in different issue-areas is 
democratically legitimate (and to what extent).   
Finally, future scholars should attempt to isolate how different democratic 
values contribute to enhancing governance functions as we move into the post-Paris 
climate regime where orchestration is expected as a key strategy, clearly manifest in 
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the orchestrated Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action adopted at COP22. 
Orchestration has emerged as an increasingly important practice when top-down 
targets and timetables have been replaced by voluntary pledge and review. Assessing 
early examples – such as the LPAA and NAZCA – helps expose the democratic 
promises and pitfalls facing the UNFCCC, states, and non-state actors as the GCA 
become a key instrument for involving non-state actors in the post-Paris period. 
Previous discussions of orchestration (and, relatedly, regime complexity and 
fragmentation) in climate governance have only tackled normative questions in an 
embryonic fashion. This paper suggests reasons why, and a strategy how, to alter 
current scholarship and take normative questions seriously. 
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Tables with caption(s) (on individual pages) 
 
Table 1. Standards for Assessing Democratic Values  
 
Presence 
 
Democratic 
Value 
Significant Limited Nascent Absent 
Participation Agenda setting and 
decision-making is 
consistently  equal 
and inclusive   
Agenda setting 
and decision-
making is 
sometimes 
unequal and 
exclusive   
Agenda setting and 
decision-making is 
systematically 
unequal and 
exclusive   
Participation is 
entirely absent 
Deliberation Justifications are 
consistently 
mutually acceptable 
and provide equal 
opportunity to 
question decision-
making  
Justifications are 
sometimes 
offered and 
individuals are 
sometimes 
excluded from 
questioning 
decision-making 
Justifications for 
authority are weak 
and individuals are 
systemically 
excluded from 
questioning decision-
making 
No justifications are 
offered and 
individuals have no 
ability to question 
decision-making 
Accountability Standards are clear 
and affected 
individuals can 
consistently 
question and 
sanction deviation  
Standards are 
sometimes 
unclear and 
sanctioning is 
only sometimes 
available 
Standards are 
systematically 
unclear and 
sanctioning is rarely 
available 
Standards are 
entirely absent and 
sanctioning is not 
available 
Transparency Clear and accurate 
information is 
consistently 
publically available  
Information is 
sometimes 
unclear and 
difficult to access 
Information is 
routinely unclear and 
difficult to access 
Information is 
unavailable 
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Table 2. Orchestration in the UNFCCC 
 
 Meta-intermediaries 
Lima–Paris Action 
Agenda (LPAA) 
 
Non-state Actor Zone of Climate 
Action (NAZCA)  
 
Orchestrator Quartet of COP 
presidencies, UNSG 
secretariat, UNFCCC 
secretariat 
UNFCCC Secretariat 
Intermediaries Business, 
transgovernmental 
networks, subnational 
actors, civil society, 
governments, public-
private partnerships 
Corporations, investors, cities and 
subnational authorities, civil society 
Targets States 
Private actors (business 
and civil society) 
States 
Private actors (business, civil 
society) 
Function Implementation of pre-
2020 climate action 
Implementation of pre-2020 climate 
action 
Type of action Cooperative initiatives by 
coalition of actors 
Commitments by individual actors 
Number of actions 77 12,522 
 
 
Table 3. Democratic values in orchestration 
 
 LPAA NAZCA 
Participation  Significant 
Multi-stakeholder 
Limited 
Cities and companies 
dominate 
Deliberation Significant 
Public justification of 
pledging 
Limited 
Deliberation limited to 
individual 
Initiatives for example PPPs 
Accountability  Nascent or Absent 
Emerging metrics for 
assessing contributions 
Nascent or Absent 
Emerging metrics for 
assessing contributions  
Transparency  Significant 
Public information of 
targets 
Limited 
Public information of targets 
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Figure 1: Orchestration 
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